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Abstract
We propose to apply a time series-based nonlinear mechanism in the threshold autoregression
form in order to examine the possible relationship between economic growth rate and its potential
determinants included debt-to-GDP indicator. Our approach employs threshold variables instead of
exogenous variables and time-series data instead of panel data to reveal the economic instruments
that have determined the business cycle in European countries for the last 2 decades – starting from
1995. The purpose of the study is to reveal the mechanism of growth (measured in terms of GDP
growth rate and industrial production growth rate) given different macroeconomic indicators, such as
public debt, rate of inflation, interest rate, and rate of unemployment with the level of growth itself
serving as the threshold variables. We identify that the monetary mechanism played an important
role in diagnosing the phases of business cycle in most European economies which is in line with
liberal economic policy dominating in the observed period. The initial level of debt-to-GDP ratio as
its increase within the recession period was of no value for the economic growth pattern.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between economic growth and public debt has been the subject of numerous studies
and publications in recent years. There is ongoing debate among economists about whether there should
be specified levels of public debt in both developed and emerging economies. The academic debate even
has entered the political arena, particularly in the European Union (EU), where criteria for economic
convergence were established in the early 1990s. The problem is not easy to solve systematically because
there is evidence that supports both positions: those who consider that public debt positively stimulates
economic growth and those who consider the opposite. The recession of 2007–2009 has re-opened the
debate on the limits of public debt in the economy and the impact of its magnitude on economic growth
(Krugman, 2012). The recession itself as well as a long stagnation period thereafter experienced by both
developed and emerging economies caused increasing debt-to-GDP ratios; this has become common
knowledge and has been perceived as a way to maintain prevailing levels of growth. Economists widely
discussed and evaluated this phenomenon after the recession (e.g. Saleh and Harvie (2005), Schclarek
(2005), Misztal (2011)). Woo and Kumar (2015) examined the impact of high public debt on economic
growth in the long run. Their analysis, based on a panel of developed and emerging economies over almost
4 decades, took into account a broad range of determinants of growth. The empirical results suggest an
inverse relationship between initial debt and subsequent growth, controlling for other determinants of
growth. On average, a 10-percentage point increase in the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a
slowdown in annual real per capita GDP growth of around 0.2 percentage points per year, with the impact
being somewhat smaller in advanced economies. Furthermore, there is some evidence of nonlinearity with
higher levels of initial debt having a proportionately larger negative effect on subsequent growth. Panizza
and Presbitero (2014) provided an interesting survey on the latest literature related to this topic. An
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analysis of the components of growth suggests that the adverse effect largely reflects a slowdown in labor
productivity growth, mainly due to reduced investment and slower growth of capital stock.
Direct motivation of our research was the paper of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) who concluded that
high levels of debt-to-GDP ratio (90% and above) are associated with notably lower growth outcomes. On
the other hand, much lower levels of the external debt-to-GDP ratio (60%) are associated with adverse
outcomes for emerging market growth. Reinhart and Rogoff’s results were questioned by Herndon et al.
(2014), who repeated the research and found that the GDP growth rate in countries whose debt-to-GDP
ratios exceeded 90% did not differ from that in countries with lower values of the indicator. Mota et al.
(2012) considered the problem of debt-to-GDP ratio dynamics in 2000–2011 across the EU countries.
They applied a fixed-effect panel model for 27 EU countries and found no support for the view that
when monetary policy effectiveness is constrained (when short-term interest rates reached or are close to
the lower zero bound), contractionary fiscal policy is expansionary. The broad explanation of this fact
is, among others, related to changes introduced in the EU labor market, such as increasing flexibility
in working time, making wages and labor costs more responsive to market pressures, and weakening
unemployment benefit systems. The authors rejected any association between the initial fiscal policy
response to the crisis and the subsequent debt crisis. Panizza and Presbitero (2013) used a panel-data
modeling approach for OECD countries in the period 1982–2008 and concluded that the case still needs
to be made for a causal effect from high debt to low growth. In addition, they showed that the evidence
of a common debt threshold above which growth collapses is far from being robust. Moreover, their
next study (Panizza and Presbitero, 2014) revealed that negative correlation between debt and growth
disappears once the model is corrected for endogeneity. On the other hand, the findings by Ilzetzki (2011)
for a sample of developing countries could not reject that in most countries, inclusion of a debt feedback
effect does not change the size of fiscal multipliers significantly. Eyraud and Weber (2013) examined the
effect of fiscal consolidation on the debt ratio and concluded, among others, that using the debt ratio
as an operational fiscal target is risky. In other words, if country authorities focus on the short-term
behavior of the debt ratio, they may engage in repeated rounds of tightening in an effort to make the debt
ratio converge with the official target, thereby undermining confidence and setting off a vicious circle of
slow growth, deflation, and further tightening. Finally Mendieta-Mun˜oz (2014) showed that short-run
fluctuations may affect the rate of growth. He studied 13 Latin American and 18 OECD economies
during the period 1981–2011 and found evidence that business cycle fluctuations have significant impact
on the rate of growth for the majority of studied economies. In addition, he stated that research on
the interaction between business cycle fluctuations and economic growth requires implementation of
various modeling approaches in order to describe specific mechanisms for each particular country in a
more detailed way. Interesting analysis of dependence between public debt and growth is provided in
Kourtellos et al. (2013). The authors examined a wide range of countries using cross-sectional data.
They rely on the structural threshold Solow growth model including many economic and non-economic
variables. They found that one of the important factors determining the impact of debt on growth is level
of democracy, that mean the level of development of institutional order. In lower democracies increasing
the debt has negative impact on economic growth.
In this study, we are in line with the studies of Panizza and Presbitero (2013), Panizza and Presbitero
(2014), Herndon et al. (2014), Mota et al. (2012), Kourtellos et al. (2013) in that a high level of debt-to-
GDP ratio does not necessarily mean a decrease in the growth rate in subsequent periods, although we
do not concentrate solely on debt. We extended the approach represented in the literature in such sense
that we examine the dynamics of the growth rate in EU countries with respect to the level of selected
economic indicators. The aim of the study is analyzing economic growth patterns within mentioned
economies given different macroeconomic indicators, such as external debt-to-GDP ratio, long- and
short-term interest rates, real estate cost indicators, consumer price index (CPI), exchange rate in levels
and first differences. The hypothesis of the research is that there are significant relationships between
the levels of indicators and economic growth dynamics. Durlauf et al. (2005) argued that modeling
economic growth based on time series is limited owing to short series of data, sensitivity of growth to
business cycles, and other short-run instabilities. A multi-regime approach in growth patterns was very
important from their viewpoint. The rationale of the threshold autoregression (TAR) model lies in the
assumption that the regime is determined by a certain variable relative to a threshold value. Given
a threshold value one can observe asymmetric reaction of the variable in interest in one regime when
compared to another. Recently, the empirical existence of a threshold has been widely analyzed in various
economic settings, for example in agriculture Zapata and Gauthier (2003), in finance Chen et al. (2011)
and macroeconomics Gnegne and Jawadi (2013). Its particular assessment to economic growth has been
determined in the publications by Tong (1983, 1990) who analyzed business cycle in the USA, Funke and
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Niebuhr (2005) who shed the light on the regional perspective of growth in Germany and Kremer et al.
(2013) who introduced a dynamic panel threshold model to estimate inflation thresholds for long-term
economic growth, to mention only a few. Thus, we propose to employ a nonlinear mechanism to reveal
possible types of the mentioned relationships. Threshold models of the threshold autoregression and
self-exciting threshold autoregression (SETAR) type are to be used to distinguish among: (1) threshold
variable(s) and its (their) level(s) in the state of prosperity and the state of recession, (2) the number
of states of economic growth, and (3) differences in business cycle between developed and emerging
European economies. The threshold model seems to be the right tool of analysis for cyclical patterns
when a certain number of regimes can be distinguished. In the analyzed period of time, several phases
of economic cycles were observed with the strongest recession of 2007–2009 (in Europe, 2008–2009).
The data (quarterly and monthly) applied in the research cover the time period from the beginning of
1995 to the end of 2013. Such a long period is interesting from yet another viewpoint, that is, it allows
investigating the mechanism of growth under two different economic policy models. From the beginning
of that period up to the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007, policies based on the Washington
consensus were dominant. Starting from 2007–2008, the situation has changed and there has been a
great comeback of state interventionism, although in some countries, tightening of financial policy was
continuous. For this reason, an interesting problem has arisen: whether the applied models are able to
show any differences between the two types of economic policy.
There is a numerous literature on how to measure the economic growth and what variables are related
with the economic growth, for example Fell and Greenfield (1983), Barro (1991, 1999) and Sala-I-Martin
(1997). Typically the aggregate GDP and GDP per capita have been used for direct measurement of
economic growth due to the fact that there is a common methodology of the GDP computing approved
by many international organizations like Eurostat and OECD. That is why relatively long time series
data are available for different economies. We use the aggregate GDP for several reasons. Firstly, we
identify the mechanism of economic growth using stationary threshold autoregression models focusing on
finding the thresholds that potentially determine the growth phases. Secondly, we extend and deepen the
analysis related with business cycles synchronization in the EU during the recession of the first decade
of XXI century Osińska et al. (2016). Thirdly, we focus on the two groups of countries: those well-
developed and emerging after the years of following of non-market economic rules. In the perspective of
our research, the GDP aggregate growth rate is the first important measure that shows economic ability
of the country to grow its potential implementing contemporary know-how. Furthermore it has been
widely used in many publications so if one is going to refer to the existing results using the GDP is a
necessity.
Examples of the use of the aggregate seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP can be found in many
researches, including the newest ones. Ahlborn and Wortmann (2018) use aggregated GDP to analyze
the synchronization of business cycles in 27 European countries. In order to extract cyclical components
from the time series, they use a band-pass filter developed by Christopher and Fitzgerald and high pass
filter by Hodrick and Prescott. The filtered data is used to create a classification of economies due
to similarities in the course of the cycle. Arau´jo (2015) uses Bayesian approach to estimate dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) to model real the GDP as a measure of the real output
for the US economy. Schreiber and Soldatenkova (2016) use the monthly real industry production index
to forecast turning points in the business cycle using the (sub)VAR approach. In the paper Benhabib
and Spiegel (2000) have used the GDP levels in cross-country panel regressions to illustrate correlation
between financial development and total factor productivity growth and investment. Madsen (2008)
proposed application of GDP, measured in purchasing power parity units, for 21 OECD countries in
research related to semi-endogenous and Schumpeterian growth models. Other examples of the use of
aggregate GDP can be found in Enders and Li (2015), Razzu and Singleton (2016) or Horvath (2018).
In this paper the most convincing argument for using the GDP is such that there exists a well-
defined methodology for business cycle identification through filtration and it is commonly observed
with quarterly frequency which is required for the purpose of our research. Alternatively, we used the
Industrial Production Index (IPI) for monthly observed data.
The remains of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a classification of European economies
is given and in Section 3 the model and methodology are described. Sections 4 and 5 contain description
of the time-series and the empirical results respectively, while in Section 6 robustness analysis via Monte
Carlo experiments is presented. Finally in Section 7 we conclude.
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2 Classification of economies
One of the most popular perspectives of classification of economies is the criterion of initial wealth
measured by GDP per inhabitant. The initial wealth is crucial for understanding the individual process
of developing an economy. According to this, the group of developing EU countries consists of Bulgaria,
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, and Slovak
Republic. In the beginning of the analyzed period, that is, in 1995, the GDP per inhabitant of all
these countries was far less than 10,000 USD, while at the end of this period in 2013, only Bulgaria and
Romania’s GDP per capita remained below this threshold. This means that the newest EU countries that
entered EU in 2004 managed to make successful progress in the process of economic convergence measured
by dispersion from the average level. This process was interrupted by the recession of 2007–2009 when
each country had to bring its economic decisions more or less in line with EU economic policy (Osińska
and Kluth, 2011). However both developed and emerging countries have suffered from the recession, and
some of them, like Greece, were even forced to ask for financial assistance from international institutions.
Facing the recession and the threat of deep crisis, governments made resolutions about financing economic
recovery by increasing public debt. It is worth noting that EU member states had different levels of
public debt-to-GDP ratios before entering the Eurozone. For example, in the first quarter of 2000, the
public debt-to-GDP ratio of the EU15 was 65.6%, while in Belgium and Italy, the values were 115.7%
and 112.8%, respectively. The lowest values were observed in Luxembourg (6%) and in Norway (23.9%).
During the last 14 years, the public debt-to-GDP ratio has increased and exceeded 90% in many countries.
In the last quarter of 2013, in the Eurozone, the ratio was 92.6%. In Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, and the United Kingdom, the public debt-to-GDP ratio was higher than 90% and in Austria,
Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Slovenia, it was close to 80%. The only exception to this
trend is Sweden, where public debt significantly decreased in the analyzed period from more than 60%
to 35–40% of GDP. In Luxembourg and Norway, the public debt-to-GDP ratio increased, but remained
at low levels of 23.1% and 29.5%, respectively.
The common increase of public debt has resulted from the changing economic paradigm during the
last great recession. When financial policy instruments failed and interest rates could not be reduced
any longer due to a liquidity trap, fiscal policy instruments became more important. The paradigm of
economic liberalization was replaced by the paradigm of interventionism of governments in economies.
Billions of dollars or euros were pumped into the EU economies, mainly into their financial sectors, in
order to aid recovery from the deep recession. According to public debt-to-GDP ratio dynamics, it is
possible to indicate three types of economies. The first group comprises countries where initial public
debt-to-GDP ratios were low and remained relatively low (e.g., Luxembourg, Norway, and Switzerland).
The second group comprises those countries where initial public debt-to-GDP ratios were very high
(more than 100%), then lowered, and increased again during the crisis (e.g., Belgium and Italy). The
third group comprises economies where initial public debt-to-GDP ratios were at acceptable levels of
about 40% and then increased; this is the biggest group comprising most European countries (e.g., the
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom). In this study, we do not consider
the debt-to-GDP ratio as a cause of all economic difficulties but rather as an instrument of fiscal policy
that is often accompanied by worse values of other economic variables, such as GDP, long- and short-
term interest rates, CPI, cost of new residential buildings index, and exchange rates (currency/USD)
(Eyraud and Weber, 2013). Looking at long-term and short-term interest rates, the following features
are observed.
1. Interest rates were in general lowered systematically, which was in accordance with the Washington
Consensus (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Norway, and Poland)
2. In the case of Hungary and Portugal, interest rates were decreasing but increased in 2011.
3. In some cases, interest rates had an overall tendency to decrease but increased and decreased in
the short run (e.g., Germany, Luxembourg, and Norway).
These facts motivated the subsequent parts of this study, in which we check whether the mentioned
variables can significantly diversify the path of the growth rate over time into separate regimes. The
cases of Japan and the USA were considered for comparison, the former because it is driven by different
economic policy and the latter because it experienced the crisis and implemented the policy of economic
loosing as the first economy in the world (Krugman, 2012).
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3 Model
The problem described in Section 2 can be modeled by a wide class of switching models, such as
TAR/SETAR models (Tong, 1990) and (Tsay, 1989), STR models (Granger and Tera¨svirta, 1993),
and Markov switching models (Hamilton, 1994). The models reveal different mechanisms of endogenous
variable dynamics taking into account the way in which the dynamics change over time. As the threshold
variable is to be verified and is assumed a priori, we found the threshold class of the models the most
useful. Here the mechanism of growth is apparent due to the explicit threshold.
Let Yt denote a k-dimensional random vector. The general model is
Yt = B
JtYt +A
JtYt−1 +HJtεt + CJt (1)
where Jt is a random variable taking values of a finite set of natural numbers {1, 2, 3, ..., p}, BJt , AJt ,
HJt are k × k-dimensional matrixes of the coefficients, εt is the k-dimensional white noise, and CJt is a
constant vector, which is called a canonical form of the threshold model. This defines a wide class of the
models, depending on the choice of Jt. When Jt is a function of Yt, then we obtain a SETAR model.
The TAR/SETAR(p; k1, k2, . . . , kp) model is defined as follows:
Yt = α
j
0 +
kj∑
i=1
αjiYt−i + h
jεt (2)
conditionally on Xt−d, where Xt−d = {Xi,t−d, Yt−d} ∈ Rj , j = 1, ..., p. It is useful to present the
two-regime model with I(y) function.
I(y) =
{
0 when Yt−d ≤ 0
1 when Yt−d > 0
, (3)
and the corresponding SETAR(2, k, k) model
Yt = (α0 + α1Yt−1 + . . .+ αkYt−k) + (β0 + β1Yt−1 + . . .+ βkYt−k) · I (Yt−d) + εt (4)
If all β0, β1, ..., βk parameters are zeros, then (4) becomes the linear autoregressive model. When the au-
toregressive model is considered, its stationarity becomes the crucial point. For the linear autoregressive
model, the conditions of stationarity are well known and easy to satisfy (see Box and Jenkins (1970)). In
the case of the SETAR or TAR model, the problem is much more complicated. Even stationary models
within the regimes do not guarantee stationarity of the whole system. Niglio et al. (2012) analyzed this
problem, based on studies by Petruccelli and Woolford (1984) and Chan et al. (1985), among others.
In the case of the two-regime SETAR model (5), when k is greater than 1, the following stationarity
conditions must be satisfied (An and Huang (1996), Ling (1999)):
maxj
k∑
i=1
∣∣∣α(j)i ∣∣∣ < 1
k∑
i=1
maxj
∣∣∣α(j)i ∣∣∣ < 1
The SETAR model with more than two regimes and other cases of the TAR model are rarely the subject
of analysis in the context of the whole system, because the formal conditions for SETAR(2) are difficult
to generalize. Although ergodicity conditions as well as distribution stationarity are known (Chen and
Tsay, 1991), formalization of the conditions for a given system is very rare. As Tong (2007) pointed out,
one of the problems is the asymmetry of the probability density function in the case of threshold models,
such as the skew-Gaussian and skew-t models. For further discussion, see Tong (2011). Another solution,
taking into account statistical aspects, is testing for unit roots within a specified TAR/SETAR system.
Kapetanios and Shin (2006) proposed and developed a test for unit roots in a three-regime SETAR
model. Again, the situation is complicated when formulating a generalized procedure appropriate for
any threshold model. The most popular—but not very elegant—approach applied in practice ensures
stationarity, first, at the stage of standard procedure of testing a time series for a unit root and, second,
within each regime of the TAR/SETAR model. This has been applied in the research reported in the
remainder of the paper.
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In our research, the following economic threshold model was applied:
GDPt =

α10 + α
1
1GDPt−1 + . . .+ α
1
k1
GDPt−k1 + εt for Xt−d ≤ r1
α20 + α
2
1GDPt−1 + . . .+ α
2
k2
GDPt−k2 + εt for r1 < Xt−d ≤ r2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
αp0 + α
p
1GDPt−1 + . . .+ α
p
kp
GDPt−kp + εt for Xt−d > rp
. (5)
where Xt−d is a set of threshold variables that are described in Section 4. In SETAR model (5), the
threshold variable is the lagged endogenous variable (here, GDPt). In the case of monthly data, GDP
was replaced by the industrial production index (IPI). When we consider other threshold variables from
a set of lagged exogenous variables, say {Xt}, the resulting model is called a TAR model.
The analyzed time series cover the period of financial crisis of 2008–2010. To eliminate possible
impact of changes resulting from the crisis, we included additional dummy variable Crisist, i.e.
Crisist =
{
1, for period 2008:01− 2010:12
0, in other cases
.
First signals of the crisis were observed in 2007 in United States and continued later in 2008. In 2008
the crisis expanded to other countries resulting in the global recession, which remained in the Eurozone
till 2010. Including the variable Crisist to the models was intended to check the robustness of proposed
approach. We estimated both types of models: with and without dummy variable Crisist in each
regime. Sequent observations of the dummy variable were assigned to the regimes according to the
threshold variable. As a consequence coefficients at the Crisist indicated the magnitude of correction of
the constant level within the regimes. This fact strengthened the effect of the crisis.
Obviously the statistical identification of the TAR/SETAR model may be limited by the data, but
it is interesting to reveal the most likely differences for the mechanism’s change within similar economic
system. The level of economic development of particular EU countries remains still diversified that
determines the expected results. For these reasons, we assumed the same set of threshold variables that
were the subject of testing for both growth measures: GDP growth rate for quarterly data and IPI for
monthly data.
4 Data
The data in the form of time series covered the period from the beginning of 1995 to the end of 2013.
Time-series data were taken from official statistics of Eurostat. The research was organized into two
separate panels, that is, time series observed quarterly and monthly. Quarterly data included (short
names are given in brackets): the GDP growth rate (GDP), unemployment rate (UNEMP), public debt
as a percentage of GDP (DEBT), interest rates (longIR and shortIR), CPI (CPI), cost of new residential
buildings index (ESTATE), exchange rates denominated in USD (EXR), and their first differences. It
was assumed that the GDP growth rate was the endogenous variable and the lagged remaining variables
were supposed to be thresholds for regime changes. The regimes correspond to the phases of an economic
cycle. In fact, what we examined was a business cycle across European countries. To eliminate non-
stationarity, the original GDP series were detrended with a Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter with λ = 1600.
Following this idea, we decided to check monthly data, which consist of industrial production index
(IPI), interest rates (longIR, shortIR), CPI and first differences of CPI, exchange rates denominated in
USD (EXR) and its first differences. Being in line with the previous panel we assumed that the IPI is
the endogenous variable.
All the original data were seasonally adjusted and transformed into logs. Time series were filtered
using the HP filter and tested for stationarity using Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkowski-
–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) tests. The number of regimes was restricted to three for the following
reasons: relatively short time series and reasonable interpretation of the business cycles in the cases of
prosperity, recession, and the intermediary states of increasing and decreasing GDP.
The TAR/SETAR models are originally suitable for stationary time series. The results of testing for
stationarity for detrended GDP and IPI series are presented in table 1. Data from the USA and Japan
were taken for comparison.
It is noticeable that all the time series of interest are stationary when the KPSS test results are
considered (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992). In the case of the ADF test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), in five
cases, the test statistics were higher than the 5% critical value, but due to the smaller power of the
ADF test, the KPSS was preferred. When the threshold variables were considered, they were taken into
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Table 1: Results of testing for unit roots
Frequency: quarterly Frequency: monthly
Variable tADF µKPSS Variable tADF µKPSS
Austria GDP -3.602535 0.090413 Austria IPI -3.134454 0.091254
Belgium GDP -2.998182 0.084473 Belgium IPI -3.002986 0.096155
Czech GDP -3.666064 0.084655 Czech IPI -2.860445 0.094126
Denmark GDP -3.331706 0.073707 Denmark IPI -4.265872 0.057792
Finland GDP -3.985277 0.072443 Finland IPI -3.333381 0.077884
France GDP -3.132938 0.092853 France IPI -3.225340 0.089785
Germany GDP -3.529351 0.069103 Germany IPI -3.568179 0.065706
Hungary GDP -3.028876 0.082063 Hungary IPI -4.641119 0.069914
Italy GDP -3.092656 0.067824 Italy IPI -2.537608 0.120174
Japan GDP -3.426199 0.098099 Latvia IPI -2.856016 0.122569
Latvia GDP -2.717347 0.112239 Lithuania IPI -2.165379 0.088470
Lithuania GDP -2.425999 0.093371 Luxembourg IPI -3.682101 0.067238
Luxembourg GDP -2.814069 0.085169 Netherlands IPI -3.700299 0.082195
Netherlands GDP -2.703567 0.106519 Norway IPI -3.925349 0.083579
Norway GDP -4.013167 0.061905 Poland IPI -2.681694 0.104379
Poland GDP -3.553682 0.083245 Slovakia IPI -2.588174 0.156716
Slovakia GDP -2.496298 0.143578 Slovenia IPI -2.005931 0.128169
Slovenia GDP -3.309978 0.122970 Spain IPI -2.635801 0.114826
Spain GDP -2.671723 0.187489 Sweden IPI -3.601550 0.071867
Sweden GDP -3.731164 0.059687 Switzerland IPI -2.386782 0.139405
Switzerland GDP -3.002516 0.099492 UK IPI -3.824086 0.063443
UK GDP -2.906273 0.092184
USA GDP -3.321318 0.099664
The critical value for the ADF test at the α = 5% significance level is t50,5% = −2.0086
The critical value for the KPSS test at the α = 5% significance level is µKPSS5% = 0.462
account in both ways: non-stationary levels and stationary first differences. This was in order to examine
the level or dynamics of the threshold (switching) variable.
The dynamics of the level of GDP in comparison with the level of public debt-to-GDP ratio and the
cost of new residential buildings index is shown in Figures 1 and 2.
In Figure 1, the original quarterly data before transformation are shown. The compared indicators
are GDP and debt-to-GDP ratio, and GDP and real estate cost index. The figures show quite different
patterns of dynamics of GDP and the possible thresholds. It is somewhat difficult to conclude that the
public debt-to-GDP ratio in different periods dramatically changes to a positive trend in GDP growth.
This can be explained in particular for the case of the United Kingdom. When the GDP growth collapsed
in 2007–2008, the debt-to-GDP ratio was far below 50%. Starting from the lowest level of GDP in 2009,
debt systematically increased, pulling GDP up to current levels. The case of the United States, presented
in Figure 3, is similar to that of the United Kingdom.
In the case of monthly data, short-term interest rates are shown in Figure 4 together with the IPI
for Spain and the United Kingdom. It can be observed that financial policy instruments are of lower
efficiency in the term of recession and after, which supports the findings of (Leigh et al., 2010).
5 Empirical results
The procedure of the research was organized as follows. First, the regime’s number was selected based
on quantiles of threshold variables. Due to the relatively small numbers of observations, quartiles were
used in computations. Minimum Bayesian information criterion (BIC) was the criterion of selection
for both the number of regimes and the threshold variable. Two or three regimes were chosen in all
cases. If threshold values within regimes were close, then the two-regime model was enforced instead
of the three-regime model. Second, the threshold variables were analyzed and for the chosen threshold,
the models of the form (5) were estimated using the conditional ordinary least squares method Tong
(1983, 1990). The values of maximum lag in regimes and maximum delay of the threshold variable
were limited up to value of 6, due to the limited numbers of observations. All the methodological
aspects of the threshold model construction, including testing for the number of regimes, the choice
of threshold variable, parameter estimation, and testing for stability of the results, were projected and
carried out using gretl computer package. Stationarity of the autoregressive component within regimes
was ensured at the stage of estimation. The procedures of selection and estimation of the threshold models
was originally written by the authors of this paper and are available in gretl package. The results of
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Figure 1: GDP in comparison to debt-to-GDP ratio and to real estate countries in selected European
countries (Belgium, Germany and Poland)
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Figure 2: GDP in comparison to debt-to-GDP ratio and to real estate countries in selected European
countries (United Kingdom and Norway)
selection of the threshold variable and the number of regimes are presented in Tables 2-4 (quarterly
data), and 5-7 (monthly data).
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Table 2: Threshold models selected for quarterly data (emerging economies)
Country GDP ∆GDP UNEMP ∆UNEMP DEBT ∆DEBT ESTATE ∆ESTATE CPI ∆CPI long IR ∆long IR short IR ∆short IR EXR ∆EXR
Czech
BIC -330.298 -330.469 -335.070 -329.250 -242.753 -231.715 -230.290 -214.012 -339.443 -333.404 -242.969 -234.251 -335.966 -324.958 -334.219 -320.899
tr1 -0.031 0.003 1.629 -0.028 28.600 -0.008 1.200 -0.000 1.800 -0.001 4.145 -0.030 3.460 -0.345 19.780 -0.008
tr2 0.023 0.039 NA NA NA NA 3.800 NA 6.700 NA 5.090 NA NA 0.080 NA NA
tr lag 4 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 3 1
Czech
Crisist
BIC -325.501(∗) -324.311(∗) -330.150(∗) -328.836(∗) -240.870(∗) -224.353 -224.477(∗) -216.091(∗) -336.058 -324.932 -231.379 -245.235(∗) -327.545 -321.622(∗) -334.158(∗) -320.117(∗)
tr1 -0.007 0.023 1.946 -0.028 28.600 -0.005 2.200 -0.007 2.800 -0.001 4.145 -0.030 3.460 -0.345 20.420 -0.008
tr2 NA 0.039 NA NA NA NA 3.800 NA 6.500 NA 5.090 NA NA 0.080 NA NA
tr lag 2 1 7 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 5 1
Hungary
BIC -299.195 -299.908 -277.731 -278.983 -204.881 -205.088 -197.825 -200.960 -298.219 -289.408 -236.536 -226.787 -306.182 -302.662
tr1 -0.030 -0.002 2.022 0.000 59.300 -0.017 4.700 -0.009 6.700 -0.003 7.600 -0.070 182.130 -0.028
tr2 NA NA NA 0.017 NA NA 6.700 NA NA NA NA 0.320 206.480 NA
tr lag 5 1 2 1 1 1 3 2 4 1 3 2 6 1
Hungary
Crisist
BIC -310.3171 -293.506 -274.768(∗) -272.105(∗) -214.526(∗) -200.615 -196.855(∗) -194.631(∗) -302.111(∗) -286.051(∗) -242.572(∗) -224.895 -302.862(∗) -306.649(∗)
tr1 -0.026 -0.002 2.028 -0.022 66.150 -0.017 4.700 -0.009 6.500 -0.011 7.600 -0.070 183.590 -0.028
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 6.700 0.008 NA NA NA 0.320 NA NA
tr lag 8 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 1 3 2 5 1
Poland
BIC -254.430 -254.461 -224.316 -225.165 -179.891 -171.931 -167.560 -177.354 -260.997 -246.160 -173.560 -174.157 -261.815 -257.136 -261.471 -250.886
tr1 -0.005 -0.003 2.272 -0.030 43.100 0.005 1.300 -0.001 4.100 -0.003 5.860 -0.135 4.760 -0.140 2.840 -0.040
tr2 NA NA NA NA 47.100 NA NA 0.006 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 6 1 3 1 5 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 5 1 5 1
Poland
Crisist
BIC -254.739(∗) -253.851(∗) -216.961 -225.185(∗) -176.460(∗) -171.146(∗) -161.407 -173.282(∗) -256.709(∗) -241.778(∗) -171.332(∗) -173.430 -271.865(∗) -249.037 -266.659(∗) -256.399(∗)
tr1 -0.005 -0.003 2.272 -0.030 43.175 -0.010 1.300 0.000 2.300 -0.002 5.860 -0.135 6.150 -0.140 2.830 0.003
tr2 0.029 NA NA NA NA 0.005 NA 0.006 4.100 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 8 1 3 1 2 1 1 4 3 1 3 1 2 1 6 1
Slovenia
BIC -448.753 -441.842 -426.068 -428.621 -332.005 -332.057 -352.537 -354.874 -454.546 -434.160 -287.220 -287.018 -308.681 -279.833 -451.044 -439.148
tr1 -0.003 0.013 1.902 -0.028 27.500 0.004 5.300 -0.005 5.500 -0.007 4.680 -0.248 0.880 -0.020 0.800 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA 0.000 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA -0.050 4.850 NA NA NA
tr lag 6 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 8 1
Slovenia
Crisist
BIC -441.858 -441.918(∗) -419.004 -422.455 -328.080(∗) -324.623(∗) -347.194(∗) -346.808 -446.792 -433.112(∗) -284.977 -283.334 -304.443(∗) -273.227 -447.130(∗) -435.063
tr1 -0.014 0.013 1.902 -0.028 26.300 0.004 5.400 -0.017 5.500 -0.007 4.680 -0.248 3.670 -0.020 0.760 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA 0.000 NA 0.044 NA NA NA NA NA NA 4.850 NA NA NA
tr lag 8 1 1 3 5 1 4 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 8 1
Slovakia
BIC -356.492 -350.285 -299.877 -291.781 -269.972 -266.951 -324.293 -322.490 -357.909 -345.283 -258.906 -238.727 -361.741 -344.728
tr1 -0.028 0.005 2.573 -0.005 34.024 -0.000 2.400 0.000 4.600 -0.008 4.680 -0.110 0.760 -0.028
tr2 0.008 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.002 7.300 NA NA NA 0.910 NA
tr lag 4 1 1 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 7 2
Slovakia
Crisist
BIC -352.860 -347.187(∗) -292.306 -283.736 -262.199 -265.921(∗) -317.174 -332.164(∗) -352.088 -341.293 -252.590 -233.173 -356.566(∗) -338.404
tr1 -0.009 0.021 2.573 -0.005 34.024 -0.024 2.400 0.000 3.400 -0.001 4.680 -0.110 0.760 -0.028
tr2 0.008 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.002 NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 8 1 1 5 2 1 1 1 7 1 2 2 8 2
(∗) This means that the Crisist was significant.
1 This was the best model but the Crisist was insignificant so the second best model was selected.
Results for the best model for certain country are bolded.
Table 3: Threshold models selected for quarterly data
Country GDP ∆GDP UNEMP ∆UNEMP DEBT ∆DEBT ESTATE ∆ESTATE CPI ∆CPI long IR ∆long IR short IR ∆short IR EXR ∆EXR
EU28
BIC -491.378 -486.437 -335.335 -341.856 -489.313 -491.694
tr1 -0.010 0.005 2.152 -0.011 2.500 -0.004
tr2 0.007 NA NA NA NA 0.004
tr lag 1 1 1 1 6 1
EU28
Crisist
BIC -497.906(∗) -488.508(∗) -346.526(∗) -341.586 -489.514(∗) -484.662(∗)
tr1 0.000 0.005 2.152 0.000 2.200 -0.004
tr2 0.007 NA NA 0.019 NA 0.004
tr lag 1 1 1 1 2 1
EURO18
BIC -563.715 -564.954 -462.683 -471.180 -411.013 -396.980 -568.375 -558.191 -569.210 -557.835 -571.293 -566.913 -580.434 -555.473
tr1 -0.008 0.004 2.125 0.000 69.100 -0.006 2.600 0.000 4.440 -0.110 3.390 -0.030 0.760 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.105 NA NA
tr lag 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 6 1 6 2 7 1
EURO18
Crisist
BIC -584.986 -570.519(∗) -455.326 -474.510(∗) -403.627 -395.635 -565.768(∗) -550.929 -577.794(∗) -561.814(∗) -586.038(∗) -565.143(∗) -576.842(∗) -552.960(∗)
tr1 -0.004 0.004 2.214 0.000 69.100 0.003 1.900 0.000 4.490 -0.110 3.460 -0.330 0.760 0.000
tr2 0.006 NA NA 0.019 NA NA 3.500 NA NA NA NA 0.102 NA NA
tr lag 8 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 7 1 8 1 7 1
Austria
BIC -557.928 -549.541 -553.448 -557.066 -425.762 -417.977 -553.418 -549.446 -554.165 -546.170 -551.344 -550.643 -557.792 -550.472 -556.260 -547.998
tr1 0.002 0.009 1.459 -0.024 66.800 0.006 2.600 -0.005 2.000 -0.002 4.350 -0.330 3.340 0.005 0.800 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 2 1 1 1 6 1 2 1 4 1 5 1 7 1
Austria
Crisist
BIC -555.955 -550.004(∗) -554.576(∗) -549.167 -429.135(∗) -417.972(∗) -549.228 -542.689 -553.811(∗) -538.802 -548.853(∗) -542.851 -553.552(∗) -547.257(∗) -552.290(∗) -541.626
tr1 0.003 0.009 1.459 -0.024 69.900 0.006 2.600 -0.005 2.000 0.000 4.410 -0.330 3.340 0.005 0.760 -0.028
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 8 1 2 1 1 1 6 1 3 1 6 1 6 1 6 1
Belgium
BIC -526.922 -517.201 -532.815 -514.278 -371.070 -363.770 -341.536 -338.758 -523.902 -514.832 -529.454 -533.741 -529.437 -519.482 -528.221 -517.458
tr1 0.001 0.009 2.001 -0.022 99.800 -0.007 0.100 -0.002 1.400 0.001 4.370 -0.315 3.270 0.000 0.760 0.000
tr2 0.014 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA -0.080 NA NA NA NA
tr lag 6 1 5 1 1 1 1 2 5 1 5 1 4 1 7 1
Belgium
Crisist
BIC -534.807(∗) -515.020(∗) -545.637(∗) -511.314(∗) -373.318(∗) -357.104 -340.865(∗) -328.708(∗) -532.149(∗) -521.841(∗) -527.267(∗) -522.487 -533.289(∗) -512.298 -524.088(∗) -517.785(∗)
tr1 0.001 0.009 2.001 -0.022 94.800 -0.007 0.100 -0.002 1.800 0.001 4.400 -0.315 3.310 0.000 0.760 0.000
tr2 0.015 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.009 NA NA NA -0.080 4.450 NA NA NA
tr lag 7 1 5 1 1 1 1 2 4 1 6 1 8 1 6 1
Denmark
BIC -437.342 -427.962 -438.418 -428.170 -308.252 -305.638 -412.121 -408.189 -440.143 -427.368 -434.986 -435.985 -435.614 -434.094 -442.190 -427.622
tr1 -0.000 0.001 1.482 -0.039 37.800 -0.006 2.500 0.000 1.800 -0.004 4.530 -0.365 2.190 -0.025 5.630 -0.005
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 6 1 4 1 1 2 1 1 4 1 6 1 4 1 4 1
Denmark
Crisist
BIC -431.213 -423.980 -435.512 -424.812 -307.561(∗) -294.379 -408.965(∗) -401.325 -443.078(∗) -429.847(∗) -431.097(∗) -428.885 -434.309(∗) -425.992 -436.499(∗) -423.787(∗)
tr1 -0.008 0.001 1.482 0.000 37.800 -0.006 2.500 0.000 1.800 0.000 4.610 -0.365 3.680 -0.025 5.630 -0.005
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA 0.029 NA NA NA NA NA NA 4.960 NA NA NA
tr lag 5 1 4 1 1 2 1 1 4 1 7 1 8 1 7 1
Finland
BIC -445.156 -455.132 -442.629 -451.281 -324.566 -316.422 -433.826 -432.045 -449.599 -437.213 -456.570 -444.691 -448.783 -446.147 -455.583 -442.181
tr1 -0.002 0.003 2.079 -0.012 43.100 0.009 1.300 -0.005 0.800 -0.003 4.430 -0.355 3.280 -0.257 0.760 -0.028
tr2 NA 0.011 NA NA NA NA 3.100 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.157 NA NA
tr lag 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 5 2 4 3 7 1
Finland
Crisist
BIC -441.840(∗) -443.559(∗) -435.710 -457.217(∗) -322.119(∗) -309.072(∗) -433.112(∗) -429.649(∗) -444.264 -438.885(∗) -444.167(∗) -438.740 -454.582(∗) -444.278(∗) -452.298 -450.696(∗)
tr1 -0.001 0.011 2.079 -0.012 39.600 -0.042 2.300 -0.005 0.800 -0.003 3.800 -0.355 3.340 -0.252 0.760 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA 0.038 3.100 NA NA NA NA NA 4.540 0.153 NA NA
tr lag 7 3 5 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 8 2 8 1 7 1
France
BIC -571.138 -563.057 -574.010 -562.487 -410.989 -399.150 -561.562 -555.344 -576.973 -553.523 -564.943 -561.257 -567.644 -560.145 -567.130 -555.374
tr1 -0.008 0.005 2.152 0.000 66.200 0.008 1.900 0.000 1.700 0.000 4.340 -0.105 1.640 -0.285 0.800 0.000
tr2 0.007 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 3.890 0.125 NA NA
tr lag 6 2 6 1 1 1 3 3 2 1 3 1 1 2 2 1
France
Crisist
BIC -577.530 -564.756(∗) -573.959 -561.221(∗) -402.221(∗) -392.500 -561.326(∗) -551.165(∗) -579.185(∗) -562.921(∗) -561.762 -559.598(∗) -568.879(∗) -556.705(∗) -561.851 -554.442(∗)
tr1 0.002 0.005 2.152 0.000 66.150 0.008 1.800 0.000 1.700 -0.003 3.750 -0.105 3.390 -0.277 0.760 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.117 NA NA
tr lag 8 2 7 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 8 1 7 1 4 1
Germany
BIC -493.049 -484.797 -494.935 -482.371 -347.275 -342.030 -316.426 -307.590 -488.380 -478.119 -489.765 -484.932 -487.798 -482.483 -489.044 -479.736
tr1 -0.010 0.002 2.041 -0.027 67.300 0.001 1.900 -0.008 1.600 0.000 3.580 -0.347 3.290 0.005 0.760 -0.028
tr2 0.008 NA 2.128 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 6 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 6 1 5 1 5 1
Germany
Crisist
BIC -493.863(∗) -496.150(∗) -507.420(∗) -482.285(∗) -341.846(∗) -343.632(∗) -320.009(∗) -308.159(∗) -504.477(∗) -485.962(∗) -497.752(∗) -486.565(∗) -505.728(∗) -490.792(∗) -494.103(∗) -480.676(∗)
tr1 -0.010 0.002 2.128 -0.027 67.300 0.001 1.900 -0.008 1.600 0.000 4.310 -0.347 1.640 -0.253 0.760 0.000
tr2 0.008 NA NA NA NA NA 3.000 0.001 1.900 0.003 NA NA 3.740 NA NA NA
tr lag 7 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 6 3 7 1 1 1 6 1
Ireland
BIC -259.751 -250.299 -252.332 -243.906 -197.756 -191.889 -255.154 -245.830 -260.934 -240.974
tr1 0.003 -0.029 5.100 -0.061 -99.259 -0.012 4.130 -0.310 0.760 0.000
tr2 NA 0.032 NA NA NA -0.001 NA NA 0.850 NA
tr lag 4 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 8 1
Ireland
Crisist
BIC -265.065(∗) -246.376(∗) -257.174(∗) -245.503(∗) -205.213(∗) -191.293(∗) -255.642(∗) -249.260(∗) -254.084(∗) -243.170(∗)
tr1 0.003 -0.029 5.100 0.000 -97.883 -0.012 4.210 -0.310 0.760 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 4 2 3 2 1 1 5 1 8 1
Table 4: Threshold models selected for quarterly data
Country GDP ∆GDP UNEMP ∆UNEMP DEBT ∆DEBT ESTATE ∆ESTATE CPI ∆CPI long IR ∆long IR short IR ∆short IR EXR ∆EXR
Italy
BIC -505.011 -500.049 -502.484 -503.622 -372.948 -364.789 -506.520 -508.523 -512.660 -516.382 -506.488 -496.481 -504.931 -512.647 -514.475 -507.755
tr1 -0.002 0.007 2.163 0.000 107.100 -0.009 1.900 -0.004 1.900 0.000 4.250 -0.100 3.290 -0.410 0.760 -0.028
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 3.200 -0.001 NA 0.002 NA NA NA 0.145 0.800 0.034
tr lag 6 2 3 2 1 1 3 2 4 1 5 1 1 2 7 1
Italy
Crisist
BIC -506.118 -495.617(∗) -490.479 -500.810(∗) -365.904(∗) -362.749(∗) -507.114(∗) -496.904 -504.876 -505.001 -503.134(∗) -492.561(∗) -500.295(∗) -507.085 -509.212 -501.477(∗)
tr1 -0.002 0.003 2.067 0.000 107.100 -0.009 1.800 -0.004 1.900 0.000 4.620 -0.120 3.290 -0.410 0.760 -0.028
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA 0.005 3.200 -0.001 NA NA NA NA 4.850 0.145 NA 0.034
tr lag 8 2 4 1 2 2 6 2 4 1 1 4 1 2 7 1
Luxembourg
BIC -341.727 -334.479 -337.067 -333.683 -251.407 -248.454 -235.861 -230.819 -341.090 -330.662 -276.067 -274.471 -337.530 -334.913
tr1 0.003 0.013 1.386 0.000 6.100 0.000 2.200 -0.005 1.500 -0.000 2.470 -0.235 0.800 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.172 0.910 NA
tr lag 6 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 2
Luxembourg
Crisist
BIC -335.403 -328.100(∗) -331.745 -328.478(∗) -233.531 -249.846(∗) -237.182(∗) -226.942(∗) -339.923(∗) -331.095(∗) -275.140(∗) -280.984(∗) -332.851(∗) -329.717(∗)
tr1 0.007 -0.001 1.411 0.000 6.500 0.000 2.200 0.001 1.500 0.000 2.470 -0.235 0.760 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.172 NA NA
tr lag 8 3 2 3 4 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 5 1
Netherlands
BIC -525.926 -514.605 -517.685 -511.810 -372.213 -366.367 -347.249 -337.800 -528.837 -503.103 -513.803 -509.692 -512.181 -511.927 -524.672 -503.018
tr1 -0.000 0.004 1.253 -0.016 51.000 -0.014 1.900 -0.000 2.000 -0.003 3.580 -0.350 1.640 0.005 0.760 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 3.700 NA NA NA NA NA 3.680 NA NA NA
tr lag 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 1 1 8 1
Netherlands
Crisist
BIC -524.106 -510.569 -512.972(∗) -505.339 -368.752 -360.292 -358.425(∗) -343.250(∗) -533.514(∗) -500.141(∗) -513.259(∗) -505.500 -515.733(∗) -518.624(∗) -517.670 -500.080(∗)
tr1 -0.000 0.004 1.253 -0.016 51.000 -0.014 1.900 0.000 2.000 -0.003 4.360 -0.090 1.640 -0.260 0.760 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 3.700 NA NA NA NA NA 3.680 NA NA NA
tr lag 7 1 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 7 1 1 1 7 1
Norway
BIC -285.556 -278.961 -279.400 -272.972 -197.514 -202.427 -179.929 -173.772 -282.772 -273.100 -278.690 -269.086 -288.072 -270.916 -279.215 -269.812
tr1 0.007 -0.003 1.131 0.000 41.900 0.004 3.400 -0.004 1.300 -0.003 5.190 -0.390 4.750 0.030 6.140 -0.002
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 4 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 6 1 6 1 5 1
Norway
Crisist
BIC -280.742(∗) -272.344 -278.272(∗) -269.156 -199.196(∗) -208.699(∗) -174.165 -172.431(∗) -282.893(∗) -269.180(∗) -283.696(∗) -280.213(∗) -280.099 -263.738 -275.278(∗) -274.427(∗)
tr1 0.007 -0.003 1.163 0.000 41.900 0.004 3.000 -0.001 1.300 -0.003 4.810 -0.390 4.750 0.030 6.140 -0.002
tr2 0.044 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 4 1 8 1 2 1 2 1 7 1 2 1 6 1 6 1
Spain
BIC -559.229 -545.179 -562.921 -547.491 -420.415 -410.631 -563.839 -537.168 -552.460 -548.742 -572.656 -546.620 -571.002 -562.338 -560.891 -543.631
tr1 -0.006 0.002 2.361 -0.010 43.500 -0.007 3.200 -0.007 2.900 0.000 4.080 -0.425 3.390 -0.373 0.760 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.102 NA NA
tr lag 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 2 1 5 1 6 1 7 2
Spain
Crisist
BIC -554.101 -540.549(∗) -556.282 -529.029 -415.905(∗) -397.425 -557.522 -529.782 -549.632(∗) -548.230(∗) -564.475 -538.575 -563.120 -555.303(∗) -552.701 -538.369
tr1 -0.006 0.002 2.361 -0.010 43.500 -0.007 3.200 -0.007 2.900 0.000 4.080 -0.425 3.390 -0.373 0.760 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 2 1 2 3 1 1 4 1 3 1 5 1 6 1 7 1
Sweden
BIC -318.557 -311.215 -318.611 -309.450 -223.467 -216.488 -313.373 -304.819 -313.671 -311.425 -312.832 -308.125 -318.178 -310.008 -317.704 -307.574
tr1 -0.024 0.015 1.841 -0.011 38.600 -0.003 3.700 -0.001 1.500 -0.003 3.550 -0.405 3.420 -0.255 7.430 -0.003
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 5 2 5 2 1 1 5 1 6 1 5 2 5 1 7 1
Sweden
Crisist
BIC -320.827(∗) -315.733(∗) -327.721(∗) -312.730(∗) -230.065(∗) -244.920(∗) -315.268(∗) -303.631(∗) -321.759(∗) -321.431(∗) -318.061(∗) -324.323(∗) -325.666(∗) -311.369(∗) -325.471(∗) -307.831(∗)
tr1 -0.024 -0.004 1.841 -0.011 38.600 -0.033 3.600 -0.004 0.500 -0.003 3.650 -0.397 3.420 -0.255 6.850 -0.003
tr2 NA NA NA 0.021 NA -0.008 NA NA 2.300 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 5 1 6 1 3 5 3 2 4 1 7 1 5 1 5 1
Switzerland
BIC -368.409 -363.167 -364.484 -370.050 -360.684 -357.429 -359.900 -356.271 -359.507 -354.471
tr1 -0.023 0.007 0.650 0.000 2.985 -0.315 0.283 -0.010 1.125 -0.031
tr2 NA NA NA 0.004 NA -0.060 NA NA NA NA
tr lag 2 1 2 2 5 1 1 1 2 1
Switzerland
Crisist
BIC -363.359(∗) -356.315 -371.568(∗) -358.922 -364.919 -348.359 -356.757(∗) -346.887 -353.953 -347.397
tr1 -0.021 0.007 0.400 0.000 2.460 -0.315 1.545 -0.155 1.245 -0.031
tr2 NA NA NA 0.004 NA -0.060 NA NA NA NA
tr lag 8 1 4 2 8 1 7 2 8 1
UK
BIC -311.135 -301.577 -302.494 -298.448 -210.825 -207.751 -303.948 -298.135 -302.549 -299.242 -304.207 -300.323 -305.425 -303.764 -304.531 -294.855
tr1 -0.032 -0.004 1.775 -0.020 38.925 0.011 2.600 -0.007 1.900 -0.003 4.755 -0.350 3.618 -0.230 0.620 -0.019
tr2 0.042 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 6.163 NA NA NA
tr lag 4 1 4 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 4 1 1 1
UK
Crisist
BIC -312.156(∗) -297.846(∗) -314.776(∗) -295.512 -198.873(∗) -204.127 -315.378(∗) -308.123(∗) -308.544(∗) -305.841(∗) -314.469(∗) -297.972(∗) -311.403(∗) -304.543(∗) -314.686(∗) -293.431(∗)
tr1 0.001 0.016 1.629 -0.020 42.100 -0.002 5.200 -0.007 1.900 -0.002 4.895 -0.120 2.865 -0.230 0.570 0.000
tr2 0.042 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 2.675 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 3 1 5 1 4 1 6 1 4 1 6 1 1 1 2 1
Japan
BIC -216.818 -214.783 -224.591 -211.900 -215.673 -213.441 -216.292 -216.887 -124.726 -132.335 -213.191 -212.838
tr1 -0.051 -0.031 1.380 0.000 -0.200 -0.003 1.420 -0.050 0.330 -0.020 108.795 -0.027
tr2 NA NA NA 0.026 NA 0.004 NA NA NA 0.010 NA NA
tr lag 6 1 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 2
Japan
Crisist
BIC -217.050 -208.681 -224.920(∗) -211.308(∗) -221.970(∗) -204.516 -212.656(∗) -209.740 -99.120 -123.794 -218.567(∗) -210.641(∗)
tr1 -0.051 -0.006 1.328 0.000 -0.200 -0.003 1.420 -0.050 0.340 -0.020 91.332 -0.027
tr2 NA NA NA NA 0.125 NA NA NA NA 0.010 118.440 NA
tr lag 8 1 5 1 7 1 1 1 8 1 6 1
US
BIC -275.434 -269.474 -271.344 -260.972 -275.147 -259.386 -274.648 -258.552 -273.749 -276.522
tr1 0.001 0.001 1.526 -0.011 1.700 -0.000 4.720 -0.425 1.099 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA NA 3.100 NA NA NA 1.316 NA
tr lag 1 1 1 1 3 1 5 1 1 1
US
Crisist
BIC -275.373(∗) -267.362 -262.575(∗) -252.437 -266.823 -254.088(∗) -267.072 -251.376 -265.702 -273.053
tr1 -0.046 0.001 1.526 -0.011 1.700 -0.004 4.720 -0.425 1.250 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 2 1 4 1 3 2 5 1 2 1
Table 5: Threshold models selected for monthly data (emerging economies)
Country IPI ∆IPI CPI ∆CPI long IR ∆long IR short IR ∆short IR EXR ∆EXR
Czech
BIC -1338.090 -1340.275 -1348.358 -1344.171 -1091.712 -1079.383 -1354.049 -1351.206 -1354.785 -1341.122
tr1 -0.033 -0.400 1.600 0.003 4.700 0.152 5.374 0.000 17.940 -0.028
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 6 5 1 1 2 6 6 1
Czech
Crisist
BIC -1330.138 -1330.836 -1338.732 -1333.915 -1085.198 -1075.944(∗) -1338.053(∗) -1341.129 -1349.420(∗) -1337.512(∗)
tr1 -0.033 -0.400 1.600 0.003 4.700 0.152 4.234 0.000 17.940 0.007
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA 0.270 NA NA NA 0.037
tr lag 1 1 6 5 1 1 4 6 6 3
Hungary
BIC -1052.596 -1049.970 -1062.222 -1064.249 -1054.622 -1044.366 -1060.806 -1063.869
tr1 -0.040 -1.910 7.600 0.003 6.373 -0.130 191.866 0.012
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 4
Hungary
Crisist
BIC -1042.666 -1040.025 -1051.906(∗) -1054.973 -1045.297(∗) -1034.200 -1052.205 -1054.007
tr1 -0.040 -1.910 8.220 0.003 6.957 -0.130 191.866 0.024
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 5 1 1 1 2 5
Poland
BIC -1055.589 -1047.625 -1066.535 -1065.694 -1049.599 -1042.445 -1067.917 -1064.313 -1064.457 -1063.005
tr1 -0.014 -0.050 7.819 -0.001 5.986 0.070 15.966 0.045 2.930 0.000
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 5 3 1 1 2 3 4 4
Poland
Crisist
BIC -1045.805 -1045.839(∗) -1058.962(∗) -1058.939 -1048.369(∗) -1041.325(∗) -1057.536(∗) -1056.811 -1058.484(∗) -1054.529
tr1 -0.014 -1.100 3.600 -0.001 5.986 -0.220 6.470 0.045 2.930 0.000
tr2 NA -0.300 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 1 5 1 1 5 3 5 4
Slovenia
BIC -1400.831 -1400.017 -1418.661 -1415.935 -1111.021 -1090.173 -1125.699 -1112.443 -1425.413 -1410.403
tr1 0.014 -0.200 7.860 0.004 5.237 -0.310 5.038 -0.020 0.700 -0.013
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 6 1 2 1 1 1 4 4
Slovenia
Crisist
BIC -1395.107 -1413.413(∗) -1406.160 -1413.606(∗) -1097.502 -1084.369 -1116.110 -1111.421(∗) -1419.766(∗) -1402.729(∗)
tr1 -0.010 -0.300 5.100 -0.004 4.462 -0.010 5.038 -0.020 0.700 -0.013
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 6
Slovakia
BIC -769.737 -773.249 -789.112 -789.956 -788.415 -789.049 -787.433 -782.069
tr1 0.013 0.200 5.000 -0.003 5.030 0.100 0.750 -0.033
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 1 4 3 5 5 5
Slovakia
Crisist
BIC -761.489 -765.199 -792.672(∗) -788.469(∗) -791.955(∗) -782.961 -780.592 -775.645
tr1 0.013 0.200 4.200 -0.003 4.675 0.100 0.700 -0.021
tr2 NA NA NA NA 5.030 NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 5 4 4 5 2 6
(∗) This means that the Crisist was significant.
1 This was the best model but the Crisist was insignificant so the second best model was selected.
Results for the best model for certain country are bolded.
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Table 6: Threshold models selected for monthly data
Country IPI ∆IPI CPI ∆CPI long IR ∆long IR short IR ∆short IR EXR ∆EXR
EU28
BIC -1489.581 -1484.786
tr1 -0.022 -0.500
tr2 NA 0.000
tr lag 1 1
EU28
Crisist
BIC -1486.719(∗) -1509.658(∗)
tr1 -0.016 -0.300
tr2 NA NA
tr lag 1 2
EURO18
BIC -1574.131 -1570.849 -1595.156 -1588.033
tr1 -0.023 -0.800 0.760 -0.034
tr2 NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 2 2 6
EURO18
Crisist
BIC -1568.316 -1597.256(∗) -1587.179 -1582.613(∗)
tr1 -0.023 -0.300 0.760 0.019
tr2 NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 2 2 2
Austria
BIC -1532.815 -1534.789 -1559.263 -1549.269 -1558.289 -1548.718 -1550.020 -1551.264 -1555.244 -1549.575
tr1 0.012 0.100 2.400 -0.004 4.082 0.140 0.728 -0.190 0.760 -0.013
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 6 5 4 3 5 3 2 3
Austria
Crisist
BIC -1523.773 -1528.448 -1549.598 -1561.271(∗) -1553.511(∗) -1538.274 -1547.062(∗) -1557.623(∗) -1546.931 -1543.877
tr1 -0.022 -0.100 2.400 -0.004 3.776 0.140 0.706 -0.040 0.760 0.019
tr2 NA NA NA NA 4.072 NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 6 1 3 3 3 1 2 3
Belgium
BIC -781.771 -788.792 -803.301 -797.760 -823.304 -803.278 -803.132 -803.955 -813.152 -794.280
tr1 -0.051 -1.700 0.900 -0.005 4.114 0.010 2.140 -0.120 0.828 0.000
tr2 NA -0.300 3.400 -0.003 5.126 NA 4.780 NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 5 1 6 1 6 2 1 1
Belgium
Crisist
BIC -778.657(∗) -790.219(∗) -794.906 -796.589(∗) -807.862(∗) -793.538 -795.865(∗) -792.289(∗) -800.536 -789.932(∗)
tr1 -0.051 -1.100 0.900 -0.003 4.290 0.010 2.140 -0.050 0.700 0.009
tr2 NA -0.300 1.500 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 5 1 5 1 6 1 1 2
Denmark
BIC -1206.650 -1207.243 -1222.996 -1193.908 -1209.580 -1219.061 -1223.001 -1197.747 -1212.012 -1189.763
tr1 0.025 0.600 1.700 0.001 4.100 -0.050 2.200 -0.126 5.516 0.000
tr2 NA 0.900 2.900 NA NA NA 5.372 0.153 NA NA
tr lag 1 2 6 1 5 1 2 1 2 1
Denmark
Crisist
BIC -1200.799(∗) -1218.903(∗) -1230.042(∗) -1190.126(∗) -1222.251(∗) -1208.273 -1228.064(∗) -1198.512(∗) -1207.297(∗) -1196.782(∗)
tr1 0.008 -1.700 1.700 0.001 4.390 -0.050 2.200 -0.275 5.516 0.000
tr2 0.025 NA NA NA NA NA 5.372 0.070 NA 0.030
tr lag 1 2 6 1 5 1 2 3 1 1
Finland
BIC -1346.309 -1343.721 -1370.249 -1358.757 -1370.662 -1367.329 -1367.827 -1380.644 -1365.010 -1366.468
tr1 0.025 0.700 0.300 0.001 5.484 0.000 4.360 -0.110 0.700 -0.021
tr2 NA NA 2.800 NA NA NA NA 0.123 NA NA
tr lag 1 1 5 3 4 1 5 1 1 1
Finland
Crisist
BIC -1345.638(∗) -1355.326(∗) -1369.801(∗) -1356.574(∗) -1359.263(∗) -1359.209 -1368.094(∗) -1382.498(∗) -1361.415(∗) -1360.557
tr1 0.006 -1.200 0.300 0.000 4.060 0.060 1.460 -0.050 0.700 -0.021
tr2 NA NA 2.800 NA NA NA NA 0.080 NA NA
tr lag 1 2 5 1 6 2 6 1 1 1
France
BIC -1642.153 -1640.425 -1662.444 -1674.289 -1679.549 -1666.143 -1668.051 -1666.015 -1668.045 -1665.142
tr1 0.008 0.400 1.800 -0.003 3.654 0.122 1.380 -0.120 0.700 -0.034
tr2 NA NA 2.000 NA 5.858 NA 4.876 NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 1 3 1 4 3 3 1 6
France
Crisist
BIC -1641.367(∗) -1668.369(∗) -1656.972(∗) -1676.859(∗) -1663.659(∗) -1657.065 -1674.222(∗) -1660.581(∗) -1665.437(∗) -1667.024(∗)
tr1 0.001 -0.400 1.300 -0.003 4.528 0.122 1.426 -0.244 0.700 -0.013
tr2 NA NA 2.320 -0.001 NA NA 3.686 NA NA NA
tr lag 1 2 1 2 5 4 4 2 1 2
Germany
BIC -1421.540 -1425.249 -1434.478 -1435.375 -1464.613 -1441.082 -1445.154 -1441.129 -1438.793 -1434.105
tr1 0.005 -0.400 0.680 0.001 5.214 0.130 3.340 -0.050 0.760 0.000
tr2 NA 0.100 NA NA NA NA 4.680 NA NA NA
tr lag 1 3 3 1 2 6 1 2 1 1
Germany
Crisist
BIC -1414.803 -1432.061(∗) -1432.260(∗) -1426.732(∗) -1431.866(∗) -1430.905 -1452.928(∗) -1443.989(∗) -1430.094 -1426.683(∗)
tr1 0.005 -0.400 1.100 -0.002 4.346 0.130 4.202 -0.050 0.700 -0.013
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 4.744 NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 1 2 1 6 5 1 3 1
Ireland
BIC -564.183 -557.170 -452.016 -453.068 -569.021 -552.717 -558.312 -560.870
tr1 0.052 -0.118 -99.393 -0.001 4.930 -0.030 0.700 -0.032
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 2 1 1 1 4 1 3 1
Ireland
Crisist
BIC -553.568 -546.671 -445.346 -449.257(∗) -559.012 -550.975(∗) -550.647 -550.909
tr1 0.052 -0.068 -99.393 0.001 4.930 -0.030 0.700 -0.032
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 2 1 1 1 4 1 3 1
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Table 7: Threshold models selected for monthly data
Country IPI ∆IPI CPI ∆CPI long IR ∆long IR short IR ∆short IR EXR ∆EXR
Italy
BIC -1141.608 -1143.634 -1167.681 -1162.117 -1162.481 -1165.371 -1165.929 -1165.827 -1166.138 -1153.110
tr1 -0.013 -0.760 1.400 -0.003 5.400 0.140 3.876 -0.020 0.880 -0.034
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 4.686 NA NA -0.013
tr lag 1 2 4 4 4 4 6 5 6 6
Italy
Crisist
BIC -1134.663(∗) -1152.885(∗) -1160.699 -1161.450(∗) -1164.520(∗) -1162.815(∗) -1160.290(∗) -1160.672(∗) -1157.324 -1149.185
tr1 -0.013 -0.300 1.400 -0.001 4.760 0.140 1.460 -0.020 0.750 -0.034
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 2.606 NA NA NA
tr lag 1 2 4 2 5 6 6 5 6 6
Luxembourg
BIC -1337.385 -1325.910 -1345.304 -1334.361 -1023.546 -1027.257 -1346.701 -1329.320
tr1 -0.002 -0.700 2.000 0.002 0.649 0.050 0.700 -0.021
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 6 2 2 1 2 1 4 1
Luxembourg
Crisist
BIC -1331.686 -1325.624(∗) -1343.922(∗) -1323.793 -1014.320 -1020.272 -1337.474 -1324.074(∗)
tr1 -0.002 -0.300 2.000 0.00 0.649 0.050 0.700 -0.021
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 6 2 2 1 2 1 4 1
Netherlands
BIC -1301.404 -1291.103 -1309.729 -1286.129 -1297.850 -1291.942 -1307.003 -1294.635 -1302.105 -1281.610
tr1 -0.031 -1.800 1.500 -0.001 3.732 0.010 3.080 -0.116 0.700 -0.021
tr2 NA NA 2.600 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 6 2 1 1 4 2 6 1 1 1
Netherlands
Crisist
BIC -1292.440 -1311.607(∗) -1316.372(∗) -1276.680 -1294.630(∗) -1282.049 -1308.748(∗) -1286.618 -1294.428 -1279.096(∗)
tr1 -0.018 -0.720 2.200 -0.001 4.526 0.010 1.460 -0.116 0.750 -0.013
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 2.606 NA NA NA
tr lag 6 2 6 1 4 2 6 1 1 2
Norway
BIC -799.573 -792.876 -798.460 -786.597 -796.383 -795.705 -802.994 -786.072 -793.748 -788.601
tr1 -0.070 -0.050 2.500 0.003 6.258 0.146 2.690 0.130 5.896 0.001
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 3 1 5 1 5 1 1 1
Norway
Crisist
BIC -790.351 -782.339 -790.904 -779.536 -788.066(∗) -788.201(∗) -794.027 -782.395(∗) -793.208(∗) -780.914(∗)
tr1 -0.070 -0.050 2.500 0.003 4.910 -0.250 2.690 -0.303 5.896 0.001
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 3 1 5 1 5 1 1 3
Spain
BIC -1079.327 -1074.063 -1093.861 -1101.611 -1097.477 -1094.103 -1097.399 -1100.909 -1108.783 -1091.235
tr1 0.006 -0.600 3.800 -0.004 4.740 0.150 4.850 -0.040 0.780 -0.013
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 1 4 3 3 1 6 1 6
Spain
Crisist
BIC -1078.303(∗) -1099.460(∗) -1090.148(∗) -1117.742(∗) -1092.421(∗) -1084.687 -1101.939(∗) -1093.001 -1099.078 -1091.429(∗)
tr1 -0.012 -0.600 3.800 -0.003 4.780 0.150 1.380 -0.040 0.780 -0.013
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 3.290 NA NA NA
tr lag 1 2 1 2 5 3 3 6 1 6
Sweden
BIC -1526.594 -1520.914 -1521.238 -1517.772 -1526.257 -1511.731 -1520.001 -1528.285
tr1 0.005 0.200 1.500 -0.002 4.430 0.080 6.554 0.019
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 6 1 1 2 4 1 5 1
Sweden
Crisist
BIC -1517.141 -1511.291 -1515.587(∗) -1520.085(∗) -1518.142(∗) -1502.153 -1514.405(∗) -1522.813(∗)
tr1 0.005 0.200 0.540 -0.002 3.140 0.080 7.966 0.019
tr2 NA NA NA NA 3.490 NA NA NA
tr lag 6 1 2 2 2 1 5 1
Switzerland
BIC -937.953 -935.604 -957.692 -954.645 -957.378 -951.508 -953.467 -951.673 -962.134 -954.246
tr1 0.005 -0.300 -0.400 -0.002 2.560 -0.225 0.250 0.010 1.202 0.008
tr2 NA NA 1.800 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 3 4 1 3 6 5 6 5
Switzerland
Crisist
BIC -931.782(∗) -936.408(∗) -952.265(∗) -953.079(∗) -955.363(∗) -944.045 -959.885(∗) -947.815(∗) -957.617(∗) -949.796
tr1 -0.014 -0.300 0.100 -0.002 2.560 -0.228 0.376 -0.100 1.202 0.008
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1.240 NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 1 4 1 6 1 6 6 5
UK
BIC -1232.795 -1227.570 -1252.058 -1258.453 -1262.727 -1247.432 -1243.056 -1246.548 -1266.388 -1244.845
tr1 0.010 -1.400 2.000 -0.002 4.984 0.070 5.410 0.020 0.640 -0.015
tr2 NA 0.300 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tr lag 1 1 1 3 5 4 2 6 6 2
UK
Crisist
BIC -1223.164 -1242.037(∗) -1255.293(∗) -1257.188(∗) -1254.084(∗) -1237.544 -1246.255(∗) -1240.070 -1261.065(∗) -1239.682(∗)
tr1 -0.011 0.000 2.900 -0.002 4.990 -0.030 6.204 -0.110 0.600 -0.016
tr2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.680 NA
tr lag 1 1 4 1 6 4 2 2 3 6
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The results can be considered within two groups of countries, that is, developed and emerging EU
countries. In the case of emerging EU countries, the CPI, ∆CPI and EXR constitute the set of most
important switching variables for both quarterly and monthly data. The CPI became a switching variable
for GDP in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, while EXR and ∆EXR were thresholds for Hungary and
Slovakia. In the case of Poland short interest rate was responsible for the mechanism of growth. It is
worth mentioning that in case of Poland the dummy variable Crisist was significant. For the variable
IPI, CPI (or ∆CPI) was a threshold variable in Slovakia and Hungary respectively. In Czech Republic
and Slovenia the IPI mechanism was driven by the exchange rate (EXR) and for Poland short interest
rate was the threshold again. These variables can be divided into three groups: those related with the
high level of initial inflation measured by CPI and those corresponding to foreign trade transmission
channel via EXR. In 2004, when emerging countries entered the EU, one of the formal requirements was
to introduce the inflation targeting policy. In addition, all countries that transformed from centrally
planned to market economies exhibited inflation. Therefore, the lagged price index became the threshold
for the observed period of 1995-2013. The importance of the exchange rate is not only related with the
competitiveness of the economies but also with the increasing capital investment via capital market and
inflow of FDI. In Poland, for quarterly and monthly data, the threshold was the short-term interest rate
what shows a linkage between monetary policy and the real economy.
As this study considered developed countries, the situation is even more diversified. When quarterly
data were considered, CPI (or ∆CPI) as well as UNEMP (or ∆UNEMP) occurred in five cases. The
∆EXR was the threshold variable for the USA, which draws the attention to the magnitude of trans-
actions realized in the EUR/USD. The real estate price index was indicated only in the case of the
United Kingdom. Monetary variables like the short-term interest rate (or ∆short-term interest rate),
the long-term interest rate and its first differences occurred incidentally in three cases, while lagged GDP
was the threshold for itself in four cases (Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg and EU28). However, it is worth
noting that the debt-to-GDP ratio was never chosen as a threshold variable and furthermore, the BIC
levels were for the models in which there were the worst (the maximum) for the debt-to-GDP ratio,
which was supposed to be a threshold. This finding supports our initial hypothesis: that a high level of
debt-to-GDP ratio does not necessarily mean a decrease in the growth rate or it is not significant in the
short run.
In the case of monthly data, the most frequent threshold variables were CPI and ∆CPI (in the cases
of Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain), long-term interest rate (for Belgium, France,
Germany, and Ireland) and exchange rate EXR or ∆EXR (in the cases of Luxembourg, Switzerland and
the UK). For Switzerland and the United Kingdom, the exchange rate was of great importance, which is
in line with the decision of the National Bank of Switzerland in January 2015 to discontinue its exchange
rate ceiling. For EU28 and EURO18 the SETAR models were supported by the data.
The general remark is that for both types of data, the set of threshold variables consists of CPI,
EXR and their first differences. Monetary variables were not of the great importance due to their low
values since 2008. Only in four cases for quarterly data and in two cases for monthly data was the
self-exciting mechanism supported by the data. These findings show that the inflationary as well as
real mechanisms played an important role in diagnosing the phases of business cycle in most European
economies. Thus, the debt-to-GDP ratio might have a contractionary impact in the short run that in the
longer run was not observed. The initial debt-to-GDP ratio level is of no value for the economic growth
pattern and was not a significant economic factor for countries with high public debt-to-GDP ratios, like
Belgium and Italy. The same was indicated in Leigh et al. (2010) and Mota et al. (2012), among others.
The path of economic growth within examined economies was than driven by real data (unemployment
rate), inflationary processes, openness of the economies (particularly, financial markets and export/GDP
ratio), and the self-exciting mechanism. The qualitative information related with institutional solutions
are also important and might be hidden in different variables. The levels of thresholds were reasonable
and depended on the range of data.
Referring back to the classification of the economies presented in Section 2, it can be stated that the
intuition directly from the results of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) was not confirmed by the empirical find-
ings. The increasing debt-to-GDP ratio as a consequence of quantitative easing and decisions generated
by central banks did not become a symbol of the defense against the recession in Europe, the United
States, or in Japan. It is difficult to state whether applying this tool has brought a satisfactory result
in practice. As the echo of recession is still present in different economies, it confirms the viewpoint of
Krugman (2012), who states that the decisions were too late and not effective. Taking into account the
results of quarterly data analyses three homogeneous groups of countries were classified:
1. According to unemployment rate Belgium, Germany and Sweden were indicated with the levels of
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thresholds 2.0, 2.17 and 1.8 respectively.
2. According to CPI: Czech Republic, Slovenia, Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland were
clustered. This group is much more diversified because the level of threshold is around 1.8-2.0 for
Czech Republic, Denmark and the Netherlands. In the case of the Central European countries the
threshold value is a bit higher, i.e. the second threshold for Czech Republic is equal to 6.7 and for
Slovenia it is 5.5. In the case of Switzerland the threshold value is much lower.
3. According to the cyclical pattern of the GDP the following group of economies was found: EU28,
Austria, Ireland and Luxembourg. The threshold value is then around zero.
This picture shows the importance of the endogenous economic policy. Particularly the changes in the
labor market in Germany are important to other European countries.
Table 8: The best TAR model for Germany GDP: threshold variable Germany UNEMPt−3
coeff. std. err. t-stat. p-value
r1 0.003428 0.001306 2.626 0.0086 ***
Yt−1 0.710873 0.112171 6.337 2.34E-10 ***
Yt−2 -0.330432 0.100803 -3.278 0.001 ***
Crisist -0.014553 0.003922 -3.711 0.0002 ***
r2 -0.000022 0.001155 -0.012 0.9847
Yt−1 0.955801 0.149022 6.414 1.42E-10 ***
Yt−2 0.519902 0.204652 2.540 0.0111 **
Yt−3 -0.598404 0.164633 -3.635 0.0003 ***
Crisist 0.002048 0.005461 0.375 0.7076
Threshold 1 8.399
R2 87.67%
BIC -507.42
Doornik–Hansen test for normality pval 0.292488
LMF test for serial correlation pval 0.562353
ARCH test pval 0.906754
White’s test for heteroskedasticity pval 0.031055
Ramsey’s RESET23 test pval 0.164748
Table 9: The best TAR model for UK IPI: threshold variable UK longIRt−5
coeff. std. err. t-stat. p-value
r1 -0.000553 0.000843 -0.656 0.5116
Yt−1 1.259580 0.060932 20.670 6.2E-095 ***
Yt−2 -0.288726 0.094331 -3.061 0.0022 ***
Yt−3 -0.020695 0.095594 -0.217 0.8286
Yt−4 -0.085090 0.095453 -0.891 0.3727
Yt−5 0.231286 0.094418 2.450 0.0143 **
Yt−6 -0.249949 0.060301 -4.145 0.000034 ***
r2 0.000583 0.001221 0.477 0.6334
Yt−1 0.984997 0.098718 9.978 1.9E-023 ***
Threshold 1 4.984
R2 92.07%
BIC -1262.73
Doornik–Hansen test for normality pval 0.022899
LMF test for serial correlation pval 0.000013
ARCH test pval 0.126984
White’s test for heteroskedasticity pval 0.002252
Ramsey’s RESET23 test pval 0.821524
The estimated models exhibit an important characteristic. In some cases, like in the case of GDP
in Germany and IPI in the United Kingdom, the autoregressive models in regimes differ significantly
concerning the number of regimes, number of lags (the persistence within a regime) and the magnitude of
the parameters estimates. Additionally in the case of Germany the dummy variable Crisis was responsible
for negative correction on the average GDP level in the first regime. The threshold magnitude was equal
8.4 that means that the unemployment rate achieving this value sharply divides the GDP regimes in
Germany. In the case of monthly data (like in the example model for UK IPI) more lags may indicate
greater persistence, but when we compare it with quarterly data the observed persistence seems to be
almost the same. The level of threshold for long interest rate is equal 4.98.
6 Robustness analysis
To verify the robustness of the automatic TAR modeling procedure for shifts of the threshold values we
decided to carry out Monte Carlo simulations.
In our approach we assume that the empirical threshold value is a priori unknown. To find it we check
all possible combinations of quantiles at different lags of threshold variable. As the number of quantiles
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is limited by the number of observations we use quartiles for quarterly data and deciles for monthly data.
Other quantiles (or even using raw data values) are possible if the number of observations is bigger than
100. Model selection procedure is based on the Schwartz information criterion (BIC), but for the model
to be considered, criteria such as the minimum number of degrees of freedom in each regime and the
stationarity in each regime must be satisfied at the initial stage. In the simulations’ scenario we assumed
that the threshold value will be drawn from the uniform distribution defined on the interval which is
a certain neighborhood of the selected threshold value (found in the model selection procedure) and
the range of that neighborhood will be changing in 3 variants. Since in the model selection procedure
threshold values were taken as values of successive quantiles of the threshold variable, in the Monte Carlo
simulation we had to ensure that the new threshold value (drawn from the uniform distribution) will not
exceed the values of the adjacent quantiles. To achieve this, neighborhood of the threshold value was
set so that the limit value was a specified fraction of the interval between the threshold value (a selected
quantile) and the adjacent quantile. For example, if the threshold value was defined as the first quartile
of the threshold variable and the range of the neighborhood was set to 1%, then the lower limit was in
0.5% of the distance between the first quartile and the minimum value of the threshold variable while the
upper limit of the neighborhood was in 0.5% of distance between the first and second quartiles. Finally,
the Monte Carlo simulation assumptions were set as:
1. Width of the threshold value neighborhood: {1%, 2%, 5%}.
2. Number of replications: N = 1000.
As a result, 3× 1000 Monte Carlo replications were performed for each selected model. For each newly
drawn threshold value (in the case of two regime models) or threshold values (in the case of three regime
models), the best TAR model was selected basing on the BIC criterion. Then, the cases in which models
for the newly drawn threshold values had a higher BIC value than the baseline model were counted
(cases when baseline model was better). If the percentages of these cases were at least 70%, the baseline
model was considered as stable. If this percentage was less than 70%, then the baseline model was
considered as unstable and such model was replaced by the second best model (in terms of BIC value)
found in the model selection procedure. The fraction of 70% seems to be reasonable due to the facts that
in many cases the baseline model was better in 100% but real data are much more sensitive than the
data generated from a given known distribution. Monte Carlo simulation results are shown in tables 10
and 11.
In case of models for quarterly data 17 of 24 baseline models were considered to be stable. In 7 cases
baseline model was not stable and had to be replaced by the subsequent model (in terms of BIC value).
For countries such as Austria, Hungary, Norway and Slovenia second model was considered as stable.
For Japan it was the third model in order, while for EURO18 and Luxembourg fourth model in order
was considered as stable.
In case of models for monthly data 15 of 22 baseline models were considered to be stable. In 7 cases
baseline model was not stable and had to be replaced by the subsequent model (in terms of BIC value).
For countries such as France, Norway and United Kingdom second model was considered as stable. For
Slovenia it was the third model in order, while for Luxembourg and Poland sixth model in order was
considered as stable. The poorest results were obtained for Sweden because the seventh model in order
was considered stable.
Summarizing, the results of Monte Carlo experiments showed that the proposed procedure of auto-
matic threshold model selection is robust against the interventions in the threshold value. The scale of
intervention was of minor impact on the results.
7 Conclusions
Although nominal convergence criteria were the same for all the EU member countries, the ways to fulfill
them were different and in many case very difficult. The level of unionization of the EU is far from
100%. The findings obtained in our study depend on the relatively small number of observations taking
into account the statistical requirements. When economic changes are studied the same time period
is considered to be a long one. Between 1995 and 2013, developed EU economies experienced intense
economic growth, which was interrupted in 2008 by the financial and economic recession. Thereafter,
economic development divergence processes were exposed. The recession revealed complicated economic
and social situations in many countries, even stable and well-established economies, like Germany and
the United Kingdom. The weakest developed EU countries, namely, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece,
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Table 10: Percentage of cases the baseline model was robust to changes of threshold values (quarterly
data)
Country Threshold variable
Interval
1% 2% 5%
EU28 ∆GDP-01 100% 100% 100%
EURO18(4) longIR-01 100% 100% 100%
Austria(2) shortIR 100% 100% 100%
Belgium UNEMP-01 100% 100% 100%
Czech CPI 100% 100% 91.4%
Denmark CPI-01 100% 100% 100%
Finland ∆UNEMP-01 100% 100% 100%
France CPI-01 100% 100% 100%
Germany UNEMP-01 100% 100% 100%
Hungary(2) ∆EXR-01 100% 100% 100%
Ireland GDP-01 100% 100% 100%
Italy ∆CPI 98.9% 99.5% 99.9%
Japan(3) CPI-01 100% 100% 65.9%
Luxembourg(4) EXR 74.2% 74.2% 74.2%
Netherlands CPI-01 100% 100% 100%
Norway(2) GDP 100% 100% 100%
Poland shortIR-01 100% 100% 100%
Slovakia EXR 80.5% 80.5% 80.5%
Slovenia(2) EXR 100% 100% 100%
Spain longIR 100% 100% 100%
Sweden UNEMP-01 100% 100% 100%
Switzerland CPI-01 100% 100% 100%
UK real est-01 100% 100% 100%
USA ∆EXR 100% 100% 100%
The numbers in subscripts indicate the rank of the model
considered as stable and finally accepted.
and Spain, suffered greatly due to their lack or unsatisfactory levels of reforms and economic divisions,
causing the crisis in Eurozone. Within this group, only the government in Ireland managed to improve
its situation significantly after 2010. On the other hand, the East and Central European countries were
considered. At the moment of entering the EU, these countries optimistically developed their economies,
but the gaps with other EU economies were significant. During the last 20 years, they reduced inflation,
improved economic efficiency, and developed many economic institutions. Slovenia and Estonia became
the leaders of institutional changes in Central European countries coming out from the middle income
trap countries (Lee, 2013). The results of this study show the difficulties these countries had to endure
in order to became part of European capitalism.
In the study, we demonstrated the results of the assumed association between threshold variables
and economic cycles, measured by the GDP growth rate (or IPI respectively) in the EU economies via
the threshold models (TAR or SETAR). Following the latest disclosures about public debt dynamics
and its influence on the growth rate, we assumed that the public debt-to-GDP ratio might serve as
an important indicator for policy change. Different policy regimes were observed over quite a long time
period but liberal policy was the dominant case from the early 1990s. We took into account the following
threshold variables: the unemployment rate, debt-to-GDP ratio, real estate cost index, CPI, long- and
short-term interest rate, the exchange rate, and their first differences. All the data were seasonally
adjusted, transformed into logs, and detrended. The analysis was undertaken using two panels of data,
that is, time series observed quarterly and monthly.
The general remark is that for both types of data, the CPI and its first differences were significantly
associated with the economic cycles. For some countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hun-
gary, Luxembourg, Switzerland), the exchange rate was of great importance as a channel for economic
stimulation (exports and imports). In the case of quarterly data unemployment rate was important
for Germany, Belgium, Sweden and Japan. Only in four cases for quarterly data (Austria, Ireland,
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Table 11: Percentage of cases the baseline model was robust to changes of threshold values (monthly
data)
Country Threshold variable
Interval
1% 2% 5%
EU28 ∆IPI-01 100% 100% 100%
EURO18 longIR 100% 100% 91.7%
Austria ∆CPI-01 100% 100% 100%
Belgium longIR 100% 100% 54%
Czech EXR 100% 100% 100%
Denmark CPI-01 100% 100% 100%
Finland ∆shortIR-01 100% 100% 100%
France(2) ∆CPI-01 100% 100% 100%
Germany longIR 100% 100% 100%
Hungary ∆CPI 100% 100% 100%
Ireland longIR 100% 100% 100%
Italy CPI 100% 100% 100%
Luxembourg(6) ∆IPI 93.7% 97.1% 98.6%
Netherlands CPI 100% 100% 100%
Norway(2) IPI 87.8% 94.3% 97.7%
Poland(6) ∆EXR 70.1% 70.1% 70.1%
Slovakia EXR 100% 100% 100%
Slovenia(3) ∆CPI 88.9% 88% 87.6%
Spain ∆CPI-01 100% 100% 100%
Sweden(7) ∆CPI-01 100% 100% 100%
Switzerland EXR 100% 100% 100%
UK(2) longIR 100% 100% 100%
The numbers in subscripts indicate the rank of the model
considered as stable and finally accepted.
Luxembourg and EU28) and in two cases for monthly data (EU28 and EURO18) was the self-exciting
mechanism supported by the data. These findings imply that inflationary and real mechanisms played
an important role in diagnosing the phases of business cycle in most European economies. Thus, the
debt-to-GDP ratio might have a contractionary impact only in the short run, which was omitted while
the relatively long run was observed. The initial debt-to-GDP ratio level was of no value for the eco-
nomic growth pattern. The path of economic growth within examined economies was than driven by
real data (unemployment rate), inflationary processes, openness of the economies (particularly, financial
markets and export/GDP ratio), and the self-exciting mechanism. The qualitative information related
with institutional solutions are also important and might be hidden in different variables. The levels of
thresholds were reasonable and depended on the range of data.
In the study, we set up the hypothesis that macroeconomic indicators can properly divide the business
cycle in the European countries according to specified economic policy regimes in the years 1995-2013.
Considering this in the broader context, the institutional order in these countries must be taken into
account together with the level of economic development and the position of a given economy in the global
system (core or peripheral). Looking back on the classification of the economies according to debt to
GDP ratio provided in Section 2, we cannot indicate any similarities concerning threshold factors within
the groups of countries, but rather, we can indicate country-specific factors. In the group comprising
countries with low ratios of public debt to GDP, it is noticeable that the business cycle in Norway is
dependent on the short-term interest rate for both quarterly and monthly data, that in Luxembourg it
depends on the GDP level and on the exchange rate level for quarterly and monthly data respectively.
In Switzerland the thresholds were: CPI when quarterly data were used and the exchange rate level
in the case of monthly data. On the other hand, in the case of the highest level of debt-to-GDP ratio
indicator, the economic cycle in Belgium depended on the long-term interest rate and in the case of Italy,
on the levels and changes of CPI for quarterly and monthly observations, respectively. In the case of the
middle group, the results were more diversified, covering almost all indicators considered apart from the
debt-to-GDP ratio. Although short interest rate was relatively rarely represented due to its low value
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reaching the liquidity trap (Krugman et al., 1998). These findings can be generalized in such a way that
”country-specific” factors were indicated as the thresholds that support specific institutional structures
across the countries, specific economic policy, as well as the position of the economy in the global system.
In order to justify our findings we applied two types of analysis. The first one was a straightforward
implementation of dummy variable denoting the crisis in 2008-2010. It should be emphasized that for
quarterly data this variable was significant in 14 cases of the best models for 24 and for monthly data: in 8
cases for 22. The second procedure was related with the sensitivity analysis via Monte Carlo simulations.
For each model the intervention for threshold value was made to check how robust are the best selected
models. The results of simulations showed that the empirical threshold models are the appropriate tool
for modeling the business cycle in the European countries.
Although many analyses have been undertaken in the last few years on the monetary and fiscal policy
instruments corresponding to different phases of the economic cycle, a proper diagnosis is still an open
issue. The quality of institutions, state integrity, the position of the economy (core or peripheral), and
the middle-income trap are some examples of states that might affect the economic growth pattern in
different countries, including the EU members.
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